Why Russia Poses a More Urgent Threat Than Iran

By James Hall
jameshall042999@gmail.com

To understand current events from Moscow’s viewpoint, consider a parallel closer to home. Imagine a foreign power supplying Mexico with armed drones that were then launched weekly against the United States—systematically destroying oil refineries along the Gulf Coast. No American government would tolerate such a situation for long. They would act. Russia will act. This analogy helps explain what Russia views as an existential red line. This is not a defense of Russia by any means—for “they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.” (Hosea 8:7, KJV)

(The United States currently has 132 operating petroleum refineries, and they are heavily concentrated along the Gulf Coast, with additional clusters in the Midwest, West Coast, and Northeast.)

“Some threats build in the distance, others are already with us.”
Art and poetry by James Hall.

The point is that this is a major and urgent story, yet it is being overshadowed by the Iranian crisis.

Public debate in the United States and Europe often treats Iran as the primary geopolitical danger. Iran’s support for regional proxies and its nuclear ambitions dominate headlines. That focus, however, risks obscuring a more immediate and dangerous threat—Russia, our old Cold War adversary.

The troubling reality is that Russia is under genuine pressure from Ukraine’s long‑range drone campaign, particularly strikes against Russian oil and energy infrastructure. At the same time, Germany and the United Kingdom have publicly acknowledged—and even boasted about—supplying Ukraine with drones and components used in some of these attacks. From Moscow’s perspective, this combination is pushing toward a red line—one Russia views as existential.

The term existential threat is often used casually, but it has a precise meaning in strategic thinking. It refers to actions perceived as threatening the survival of a state itself. For Russia, sustained attacks on its energy infrastructure—combined with overt Western involvement—fall squarely into that category.

This is not speculation. Over the past two years, senior intelligence officials in Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European states have issued explicit, on‑the‑record warnings about Russia’s trajectory and how it may respond. Rather than moderating its behavior, Russia appears increasingly emboldened by the war in Ukraine.

Germany, in particular, has been unusually blunt. In public hearings before the Bundestag, the heads of Germany’s foreign, domestic, and military intelligence services have warned that Russia is already retaliating against the West through sabotage, espionage, drone incursions, and so‑called “hybrid attacks.” Crucially, many of these activities are not hypothetical—they are occurring inside Germany today.

In contrast, while Iran’s threat is typically framed through the lenses of regional proxies and nuclear ambition, Russia has moved the confrontation directly onto European soil. The frontline is no longer abstract or distant. It now intersects with logistics networks, infrastructure, and civilian spaces across Europe—and, by extension, affects Western allies, including the United States.

In 2024 and 2025, Russia’s main military intelligence directorate, commonly known as the GRU, was linked to a deeply alarming campaign involving incendiary devices disguised as consumer goods. These devices ignited inside major logistics facilities in Germany and the United Kingdom, narrowly avoiding catastrophic disasters. These were not symbolic gestures or mere warnings; they appear to have been failed attempts at mass‑casualty events on NATO territory.

Russia’s tactics have since evolved into what analysts increasingly describe as a “gig economy of sabotage.” Following the widespread expulsion of diplomats who doubled as intelligence operatives, Moscow began recruiting low‑level criminals and vulnerable individuals through encrypted platforms such as Telegram. Paid in cryptocurrency, these recruits have carried out arson and vandalism attacks, including fires at shopping centers and industrial sites in Poland. Even more troubling, authorities have disrupted plots targeting rail lines, water supplies, and dams across Northern Europe.

Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the Middle East. But Russia is engaged in something different—and more dangerous for the West which can only be described as a sustained effort to dismantle Europe’s security architecture from within. Through what Russian doctrine calls New Generation Warfare, Moscow blends cyber operations, disinformation, economic pressure, and political manipulation. Artificial‑intelligence‑generated content is used to amplify extremist parties, undermine democratic legitimacy, and erode public trust in elections.

At the same time, Russia has shifted decisively to a war economy. It now produces much of its weaponry domestically, reducing reliance on external partners—including Iran—and enabling it to sustain a prolonged confrontation with the West.

Western governments—particularly the United States—have publicly warned that Russia may be developing a nuclear anti‑satellite (ASAT) weapon intended for use in space. According to US Space Command officials, the concern is not a nuclear strike on cities, but a nuclear device placed into Earth orbit—likely low Earth orbit (LEO)—and detonated to disable or destroy satellites. Such a detonation could generate a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP), flood orbital regions with radiation, and disable or destroy large numbers of satellites simultaneously. A single explosion could affect many satellites at once.

A nuclear detonation in LEO would not immediately throw society “back to the 1800s,” but it would seriously disrupt the invisible infrastructure modern life depends on—especially satellites and precise timing systems. The damage would be widespread, uneven, and long‑lasting, which is precisely what makes such a weapon strategically alarming.

So what would the advantage be for Russia—why would it consider detonating a nuclear weapon in LEO?

The logic only makes sense when viewed through Russian strategic doctrine. From Moscow’s perspective, the value of such a weapon is not about mass destruction or civilian casualties. It is about exploiting a deep vulnerability of modern Western societies, being their reliance on satellites. The United States and its allies depend heavily on space‑based systems for military command and control, intelligence, GPS navigation, communications, financial timing, and aspects of everyday civilian life. Russia relies on these systems as well—but to a significantly lesser degree.

By detonating a nuclear device in orbit, Russia could disable or degrade large numbers of satellites at once, disrupting these critical systems and imposing disproportionate costs on its adversaries without firing a missile at a city or killing civilians directly.

Such a weapon is best understood as a tool of coercion rather than battlefield combat. A nuclear detonation in space could produce enormous strategic shock—interrupting communications, freezing financial systems, degrading military effectiveness, and sowing global uncertainty—while stopping short of the mass casualties that would almost certainly trigger an unquestioned full‑scale nuclear response. This creates a dilemma for Western leaders. That is the damage would be severe and global, but the response would be politically and legally complex, especially since the attack would target infrastructure rather than people.

This could turn the deterrence principle on its head.

The weapon also undermines one of the West’s main defensive strategies, being the deployment of large numbers of small, relatively inexpensive satellites to improve resilience. That approach works well against conventional anti‑satellite weapons, which must destroy targets individually, but it is far less effective against the radiation and electromagnetic effects of a nuclear detonation.

Perhaps most importantly, such a weapon has value even if it is never used. Simply possessing—or placing—an orbital nuclear device would signal Russia’s willingness to escalate conflict into space, holding the global satellite environment at risk. That persistent threat could influence Western decision‑making during a crisis, forcing leaders to weigh escalation risks far more cautiously.

Nuclear proliferation in Iran is undoubtedly a threat, but it pales in comparison to Russia’s established might. Russia possesses over 5,000 sophisticated warheads ready for immediate deployment. Even if Iran were to develop a weapon today, the specialized engineering required to deliver it effectively is just as complex as creating the core itself—a capability Russia has long since mastered.

In conclusion, the urgency of the Russian threat lies in both geography and intent. Iran, in contrast, targets US interests and regional rivals in the Middle East. Russia targets the foundational safety of European societies themselves. When intelligence chiefs warn that Europe is “one step away” from direct kinetic conflict, they are not speaking in abstractions. They are pointing to burning warehouses, sabotaged infrastructure, and Russian drones probing NATO airspace.

For Europe, and now the United States, the threat is no longer over the horizon.
It is already inside the house.

Michael and James Hall, authors of the popular The Sword of Damocles: Our Nuclear Age, now on Audible, Kindle and Amazon books.